Colombian literature of the nineteenth century captures the emerging process of the new nation and shows the ethical changes needed for the formation of a new country. By using the Colombian novel and poetry produced in the nineteenth-century, this paper will show how these are unfolded in practical effects of the works, drawing on the authors’ desire to influence with their work the ethical and political progress of the country, their society and the life of citizens, and to contribute to (...) the foundation of the modern state in Colombia through a citizen ethics proposed in the texts. Additionally, this paper stresses the literary effort of reappraising the national moral and political situation, of confronting this with the past and, accordingly, of assessing the current situation. -/- La literatura colombiana del siglo XIX captura el proceso de la emergente nación e indica los cambios éticos necesarios para la conformación de un nuevo país. Recurriendo a la novela y la poesía colombiana del siglo XIX, se evidenciará cómo se despliega en estas efectos prácticos de las obras, bajo el anhelo del autor de incidir con sus letras en el progreso ético y político del país, la sociedad y la vida de los ciudadanos, con la fundación del Estado Moderno en Colombia a través de una ética ciudadana propuesta en los textos. Igualmente, se resalta el empeño literario de revaluar la situación moral y política nacional, confrontarla respecto al pasado y evaluar la actualidad conforme a ella. (shrink)

Through the 'Spiritual Affections' of the Abbess of Tunja, Sister Francisca Josefa de la Concepción del Castillo, a reflection on colonial art is posed around the question of its apparent usefulness as a 'vehicle of evangelization', investigating its genuine purpose in the mysticism of the Mother of the Castle and the relationship of her work with Him. The aesthetic purpose of the work of colonial art is to bring the Divine closer to the human, trying to reflect and communicate the (...) testimony of a mystical spiritual search and experience lived by the author, inspired and revealed by God. -/- A través de los 'Afectos Espirituales' de la Abadesa de Tunja, Sor Francisca Josefa de la Concepción del Castillo, se plantea una reflexión acerca del arte colonial en torno a la cuestión de su aparente utilidad como 'vehículo de evangelización', indagando su genuino propósito en el misticismo de la Madre del Castillo y la relación de su obra con Él. Se planteará que el propósito estético de la obra de arte colonial es acercar lo Divino a lo humano, intentado reflejar y comunicar el testimonio de una búsqueda y experiencia espiritual mística vivenciada por la autora, inspirada y develada por Dios. (shrink)

The thesis that technology is applied science is called by Niiniluoto (1997) the standard view. That is surprising because the identification between technology and applied science has been widely rejected by both historians and philosophers of technology, including Rapp (1974), Bugliarello and Doner (1976), Derry and Williams (1977), Feibleman (1983), Skolimowski (1966), Vermaas et al., (2011), Don Idhe (2013). The reasons of such rejection mainly stem from the fact that technology has historically progressed without the benefit of science, i.e., it (...) has been possible to design technological devices without the explicit and systematic development of the scientific theories and laws that would explain their functioning. Polish philosopher Henryk Skolimowski has attacked this identification based on historical evidence. He argues that in the development of technology, there are many cases wherein technological designs have supported pure scientific research, rather than the other way round if technology were applied science. According to Skolimowski, some cases that dispute the identification of technology as applied science are the design of the transistor, supersonic aircraft, and the Manhattan Project. However, this historical evidence should not persuade us for two reasons: 1) Rejecting the previous scientific research that served as the basis for the said technological designs commits Skolimowski to anachronism. 2) From a realistic perspective of science, technological devices are not only subject to the principles and laws of science, regardless of the extent of our knowledge of them, but incorporate insights on more articulated explanations that while not available at the time of designing, do inspire our practical and theoretical efforts and guide further work. In this paper, we posit that the cases offered by Skolimowski to motivate his rejection of the standard view are far from being conclusive. To this end, we not only critically assess each case but also identify other historical examples that might be even more promising to support Skolimowski's thesis. Finally, we critically deal with those more promising cases and argue for a deflationary interpretation of the standard view. -/- . (shrink)

O objetivo principal deste trabalho é apresentar a distinção entre ciência e cientificismo e, com base no trabalho de van Fraassen, intitulado A imagem científica (2006), discutir sobre as circunstâncias em que o cientificismo poderia ser repudiado. O cientificismo é uma corrente de pensamento que somente considera válido um conhecimento se ele for científico. Segundo essa corrente, os procedimentos da ciência natural seriam mais especiais, uma vez que, dentre outros motivos, eles são capazes de descrever regularidades e possibilitar predições. Dessa (...) forma, o cientificismo defende que os procedimentos não científicos não possuem valor algum, pois não seriam capazes de descrever regularidades e realizar predições como fazem os procedimentos da ciência natural. Trataremos de maneira crítica essa concepção, apresentando o argumento de van Fraassen de que a descrição de uma regularidade também pode ser construída por explicações não científicas. Em sua opinião, o poder explicativo de uma teoria vai além de sua importância empírica, ele é radicalmente dependente do contexto. Isso significa que as regularidades descritas por uma crença científica são também dependentes de explicações não científicas, como as explicações da psicologia, da história, da filosofia, da sociologia, etc. Assim, a forte predição que encontramos na ciência natural não é realizada somente com base na adequação empírica e científica, mas com base em um sistema de explicações não científicas. Isso torna incorreta a classificação do conhecimento científico como o mais verdadeiro ou especial por ser capaz de descrever regularidades e realizar a predições. Pretende-se, com isso, refletir se o conhecimento pode ser construído por outras áreas não científicas, sem que o conhecimento seja com isso prejudicado. Uma reflexão necessária que servirá para apresentar um dos problemas que tornam o cientificismo indesejável. (shrink)

Why do we have social norms—of fairness, cooperation, trust, property, or gender? Modern-day Humeans, as I call them, believe these norms are best accounted for in cultural evolutionary terms, as adaptive solutions to recurrent problems of social interaction. In this paper, I discuss a challenge to this “Humean Program.” Social norms involve widespread behaviors, but also distinctive psychological attitudes and dispositions. According to the challenge, Humean accounts of norms leave their psychological side unexplained. They explain, say, why we share equally, (...) but not why we disapprove of those who don’t. I defend the Humean Program against this challenge. In particular, I suggest an idea for how to extend the Program to account for the psychological side of norms. Socially adaptive behaviors aren’t just likely to emerge in a group; They are also likely to be widely taught within it. The transmission of these behaviors through instruction explains why they are associated with distinctive normative attitudes and dispositions. These attitudes play a pedagogical role in helping transmit these behaviors to children and newcomers. (shrink)

Evânia Reich presents the argument that the veil laws in France—the banning of the full-face coverings in public and the banning of the headscarf in public schools—are consistent with the emancipatory project of French Laïcité. According to this argument, the veils that Muslim women wear are symbols of their oppression, whereas French education seeks to liberate each individual and Laïcité serves as a bulwark against the creeping oppressive influence of religion. Unveiling Muslim women, then, is an act of emancipation. In (...) this essay, I argue that the view of French secularism as an emancipatory project to free women of the oppressive mechanism of the veil is an example of what Marilyn Frye calls the “arrogant eye.” In this essay, I offer an alternative approach on the veil following Frye’s notion of the “loving eye.”. (shrink)

Education is a pillar of buen vivir, the guiding ideal of Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution. In this framework, Ecuador made significant shifts in its education system from 2006 to 2016, the decade of the Citizens’ Revolution. The key buen vivir concepts and processes that framed these shifts were considering education as a right, as a social debt, and as a driver of a more just, knowledge-intensive and clean economy. Resource allocation, general access, learning, and inclusion of structurally marginalized groups showed significant (...) improvement in this decade, along with other key political, economic and social changes, thus making significant advances in the emancipation of society toward buen vivir, and marking elements of how and why advancing this transformation is important. (shrink)

La presente contribución tiene por objeto examinar y describir la génesis y la elaboración de los Nuevos Ensayos sobre el entendimiento humano de Leibniz ). El interés de este estudio recae no sólo en transparentar la articulación histórica y teórica en que tienen lugar las etapas que preceden la redacción misma de los Nuevos Ensayos de Leibniz -equivalente a un período de casi diez años y que coincide con el punto de arranque de la maduración definitiva de su filosofía-, sino (...) también en atenuar la connotación estrictamente epistemológica que suele atribuírsele a dicha obra, subrayando las motivaciones metafísicas y teológicas que lo impulsaron a redactarla en respuesta al Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano de Locke. Palabras clave: Dios, Leibniz, Locke, Nuevos Ensayos, Materialismo, Metafísica, Substancia, Teología. (shrink)

Auty (1993) and Sachs and Warner (1997) reignited the line of argument of the resource curse: the idea that natural resource wealth has negative net effects on the development of nations. However, the result has been found to be highly dependent on the types of variables used to represent natural resource wealth (Brunnschweiler, 2007) and similar questions can raised about variables used to represent being “cursed”. In this paper we pursue the hunt for better variables by looking at the relationship (...) between average income from natural resources per person and a wide array of key development indicators: Adjusted National Net Income, GDP per capita, an aggregate of services and industrialized goods, inequality measured by the Gini index, Poverty, the Human Development Index, the Prosperity Index, the Social Progress Index and the Fragile State Index. We do this on a global scale between 1970 and 2010. On the contrary, we find that natural resource wealth is positively linked to development. We suggest, alternatively, that much of the actual cases where abundant natural resources hurt nations have been cases of common theft by tyrants, often backed by imperial powers. (shrink)

This paper suggests the democratic direction in which the right of freedom of expression should be conceived and applied. In the first two sections it suggests some counter-examples to, and diagnoses of, the libertarian and liberal conceptions of freedom of expression, taking Scanlon (1972) and Scanlon (1979), respectively, to be their chief proponents. The paper suggests that these conceptions cannot take into account clear examples, like fraudulent propaganda, which should not be legal. The democratic conception takes it to heart that (...) the pillars upon which the right of freedom of expression is founded are individual and collective autonomy, the right to know facts of public interest and information necessary for effective democratic control of government. The paper suggests that in a time when private powers seriously threaten these pillars, it is correct for the government to step in to provide the framework in which genuine discussion geared toward fulfilling the objectives of these pillars can take place. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar as ponderações de Nietzsche sobre a filosofia nascente de Tales de Mileto com base em trechos selecionados dos ensaios nietzschianos do período da juventude intitulados A filosofia na época trágica dos gregos e Sobre verdade e mentira no sentido extramoral, da obra do período de transição A gaia ciência, assim como da obra do período mais tardio de sua vida intitulada Genealogia da moral, uma polêmica. Os trechos são suficientes para enfatizar o “erro” presente (...) na hipótese da água e as implicações da “intuição filosófica” de Tales para a representação da phýsis. Nietzsche pondera que a contemplação de Tales foi movida por uma crença ilógica, fantasiosa e indemonstrável, que encontramos em todos os filósofos, de que é possível acessar a realidade objetiva pelo “conhecimento”. Pondera ainda que o “filosofar indemonstrável” de Tales tem ainda o seu valor em pretender ser em todo caso não místico e não alegórico. Essas ponderações de Nietzsche sobre o filosofar de Tales servem neste trabalho para consolidar a perspectiva nietzschiana de que o conhecimento em suas formas de representar a “vida”, desde Tales, é movido pela crença ilógica na “verdade”, não na “aparência”. (shrink)

It is still common to find the traditionalist and rationalist conception that scientific knowledge is the most accurate way of describing natural data, as if, therefore, the notion of knowledge were identical to the notion of natural science. In this article, this conception is problematized, based on some concrete cases of the history of science that seem to show that the beliefs of natural science can also be explained on the basis of non-scientific beliefs, such as the beliefs of sociology, (...) psychology, history and philosophy. That is, the main purpose of this paper is to argue that the assessment one can have of scientific clarity can not be constructed only through explanations provided by the procedures of natural science, but also through explanations provided by the procedures of other distinct areas. This argument runs counter to traditionalist rationalism and will be used in this article to criticize the conception that knowledge, in order to be valid, will necessarily have to be scientific and rational. (shrink)

Es difícil imaginar una sociedad del buen vivir sin arte. Por ello, la creatividad artística es reconocida como derecho en la Constitución del Ecuador, y como derecho humano en los intrumentos internacionales relevantes. Partiendo de esta reflexión, los artículos de este libro argumentan que siendo el arte un derecho, le corresponde al Estado la provisión de condiciones para su garantía por medio de políticas públicas, que deben tomar en cuenta tanto las especificidades de las personas, y los pueblos y nacionalidades, (...) como el contexto tecnológico de la era digital, que brinda las bases para una sociedad abierta donde el conocimiento sea libre. (shrink)

Detractors of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument have arrived at a virtual consensus that the mental properties of the Man performing the computations stipulated by the argument are irrelevant to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper challenges this virtual consensus to argue for the first of the two main theses of the persons reply, namely, that the mental properties of the Man are what matter. It does this by challenging many of the arguments and conceptions put forth by the (...) systems and logical replies to the Chinese Room, either reducing them to absurdity or showing how they lead, on the contrary, to conclusions the persons reply endorses. The paper bases its position on the Chinese Room Argument on additional philosophical considerations, the foundations of the theory of computation, and theoretical and experimental psychology. The paper purports to show how all these dimensions tend to support the proposed thesis of the persons reply. (shrink)

This paper is a follow-up of the first part of the persons reply to the Chinese Room Argument. The first part claims that the mental properties of the person appearing in that argument are what matter to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper tries to discern what those mental properties are by applying a series of hypothetical psychological and strengthened Turing tests to the person, and argues that the results support the thesis that the Man performing the computations (...) characteristic of understanding Chinese actually understands Chinese. The supposition that the Man does not understand Chinese has gone virtually unquestioned in this foundational debate. The persons reply acknowledges the intuitive power behind that supposition, but knows that brute intuitions are not epistemically sacrosanct. Like many intuitions humans have had, and later deposed, this intuition does not withstand experimental scrutiny. The second part of the persons reply consequently holds that computational cognitive science is confirmed by the Chinese Room thought experiment. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to present the influence of Plotinus' thought on the political philosophy of the Roman Emperor Julian, between the years 361 to 363. The methodology consists of selecting excerpts from the works of Juliano Misopogon and Cartas y Fragmentos that may indicate the influence of the ideas of Plotinus' Ennead in the speech given by the Emperor to legitimize his political power. Juliano argues that the laws of the empire were created by the gods for (...) the organization of human life, so that obedience to the gods necessarily requires an obedience to those laws. According to Juliano, knowledge or episteme about the laws of empire is conditioned to the escape from sensible reality in the name of spiritual reality, in which the wise ruler also needs to transcend the body to know and obey divine laws. Thus, after analyzing Juliano's arguments, we seek to reflect on the viability of the political system adopted by him, especially if the reception of his ideas by rulers from the 20th century onwards is considered. (shrink)

Es difícil imaginar una sociedad del buen vivir sin arte. Por ello, la creatividad artística es reconocida como derecho en la Constitución del Ecuador, y como derecho humano en los intrumentos internacionales relevantes. Partiendo de esta reflexión, los artículos de este libro argumentan que siendo el arte un derecho, le corresponde al Estado la provisión de condiciones para su garantía por medio de políticas públicas, que deben tomar en cuenta tanto las especificidades de las personas, y los pueblos y nacionalidades, (...) como el contexto tecnológico de la era digital, que brinda las bases para una sociedad abierta donde el conocimiento sea libre. (shrink)

This work, in English "Struggle for power, organic crisis and judicial independence", has its origin in research academics of the IAEN carried out to provide expert advise to the Inter American Court of Human Rights in the case Quintana and others (Supreme Court of Justice) vs the State of Ecuador. The research is about the nature of the evolution of the ecuadorian state, the dynamics of its institutions, its players, parties, laws, its factors of instability, the way rights have been (...) deployed since the return to democracy in 1979, those who have benefited from neoliberal democracy and those who have paid the costs, and where in all this was the Supreme Court of Justice. The Introduction takes a look at this origin of the work and its intellectual import, provides a brief characterization of the Inter American Sistem of Human Rights Protection, how the Quintana Case fits within it, and an overview of the chapters and their logic. The first chapter analyzes the institutional and sociological factors that have contributed to Ecuador's historically unstable state, based primarily in an antagonistic struggle for power between the Executive and Legislative branches. The second chapter analyzes the economic and political factors that provoked an organic crisis, or crisis of hegemony, between 1997 and 2007 in Ecuador. The third chapter analyzes the evolution of the way in which judges are selected in Europe, the outcomes they have generated, and how they compare with the ecuadorian systems of judge selection in terms of securing judicial independence. The fourth chapter develops a theory of judicial independence in democracy and analyzes how Ecuador measures up to that standard, from when it became a neoliberal minimal democracy in 1981, to when it became a neoliberal false democracy as a consequence of instalation of a system evidently lacking in the people's support under the guise of the 1998 Constitution and its system of judge selection, and the new democratic horizons set by the 2008 Constitution, and the judicial system that springs from it. (shrink)

The thesis develops solutions to two main problems for mental realism. Mental realism is the theory that mental properties, events, and objects exist, with their own set of characters and causal powers. The first problem comes from the philosophy of science, where Psillos proposes a notion of scientific realism that contradicts mental realism, and consequently, if one is to be a scientific realist in the way Psillos recommends, one must reject mental realism. I propose adaptations to the conception of scientific (...) realism to make it compatible with mental realism. In the process, the thesis defends computational cognitive science from a compelling argument Searle can be seen to endorse but has not put forth in an organized logical manner. A new conception of scientific realism emerges out of this inquiry, integrating the mental into the rest of nature. The second problem for mental realism arises out of non-reductive physicalism- the view that higher-level properties, and in particular mental properties, are irreducible, physically realized, and that physical properties are sufficient non-overdetermining causes of any effect. Kim’s Problem of Causal Exclusion aims to show that the mental, if unreduced, does no causal work. Consequently, given that we should not believe in the existence of properties that do not participate in causation, we would be forced to drop mental realism. A solution is needed. The thesis examines various positions relevant to the debate. Several doctrines of physicalism are explored, rejected, and one is proposed; the thesis shows the way in which Kim’s reductionist position has been constantly inconsistent throughout the years of debate; the thesis argues that trope theory does not compete with a universalist conception of properties to provide a solution; and shows weakness in the Macdonald’s non-reductive monist position and Pereboom’s constitutional coincidence account of mental causation. The thesis suggests that either the premises of Kim’s argument are consistent, and consequently his reductio is logically invalid, or at least one of the premises is false, and therefore the argument is not sound. Consequently, the Problem of Causal Exclusion that Kim claims emerges out of non-reductive physicalism does not force us to reject mental realism. Mental realism lives on. (shrink)

This book addresses key conceptual issues relating to the modern scientific and engineering use of computer simulations. It analyses a broad set of questions, from the nature of computer simulations to their epistemological power, including the many scientific, social and ethics implications of using computer simulations. The book is written in an easily accessible narrative, one that weaves together philosophical questions and scientific technicalities. It will thus appeal equally to all academic scientists, engineers, and researchers in industry interested in questions (...) related to the general practice of computer simulations. (shrink)

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify (...) self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery. (shrink)

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...) argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance. (shrink)

Tradicionalmente, se ha argumentado que el concepto de eudaimonía en Aristóteles se encuentra anclado en el contexto de una comprensión teleológica del universo, por cuanto dicha noción parece radicar en una definición funcionalista de la naturaleza humana. Teniendo esto en mente, Bernard Williams ha desarrollado una crítica en contra de la propuesta ética de Aristóteles, acusándola de una cierta ambición científica en el campo del razonamiento práctico que resulta insostenible actualmente. Este ensayo busca discutir si, en efecto, estos señalamientos tienen (...) un sustento plausible o si, por el contrario, se basan en una interpretación debatible de los fundamentos de la ética aristotélica. Con este propósito, se analiza la justificación del razonamiento ético de Aristóteles a la luz de los argumentos de Williams y de algunos de sus contradictores. (shrink)

According to many philosophers, rationality is, at least in part, a matter of one’s attitudes cohering with one another. Theorists who endorse this idea have devoted much attention to formulating various coherence requirements. Surprisingly, they have said very little about what it takes for a set of attitudes to be coherent in general. We articulate and defend a general account on which a set of attitudes is coherent just in case and because it is logically possible for the attitudes to (...) be jointly satisfied in the sense of jointly fitting the world. In addition, we show how the account can help adjudicate debates about how to formulate various rational requirements. (shrink)

Frente a quienes sostienen una incompatibilidad entre historia de la filosofía y filosofía, en cuanto plantean una disyuntiva entre una práctica descriptiva y una argumentativa, en este trabajo nos proponemos mostrar, examinando la labor histórico-filosófica de Aris- tóteles, que esa disyuntiva no es excluyente. Para ello, en primer lugar, examinaremos algunos pasajes de su obra en los que ofrece indicaciones metodológicas que permiten comprender la doble función que cumplen las exposiciones críticas de los filósofos precedentes en la constitución misma de (...) su filosofía. En segundo lugar, ilustraremos el tipo de argumentación aristotélica a través del análisis de las críticas que dirige a las Ideas platónicas como causas. Contra Platón, Aristóteles establece que, para dar cuenta de la ingenerabilidad e incorruptibilidad de las formas, no es necesario caracterizarlas como entidades separadas de la materia y del movimiento. Basta asegurar la eternidad de la forma a través de su reproducción en otros individuos de la misma especie. Tal análisis nos permite concluir, finalmente, que filosofía o historia de la filosofía constitu- yen una falsa disyuntiva en Aristóteles, por lo que el examen dialéctico de las doctrinas precedentes es un método adecuado de indagación filosófica. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on (...) general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and (...) correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert you are at self-control, the less likely you are to use it. (shrink)

CAMILO, Bruno. Princípios metafísicos do método newtoniano. In: CONTE, Jaimir; MORTARI, Cezar Augusto. (org.). Temas em filosofia contemporânea. Florianópolis: NEL/UFSC, 2014. p. 172-183. (Coleção rumos da epistemologia; 13). -/- É no modus operandi de Isaac Newton que visualizamos a relação entre o método dedutivo e o indutivo na análise científica dos fenômenos e a relação entre a metafísica e a prática científica. Pois, de um lado temos a “mecânica racional”, a qual compreende que a única forma de garantir a (...) certeza de algo é dispô-lo matematicamente, propondo a redução da natureza às categorias matemáticas, de outro, temos a “mecânica geométrica” que propõe grandes sistemas coerentes com a realidade empírica, cujo experimento criterioso é fundamental para o estabelecimento de verdades ou conceitos acerca dessa realidade. O modus operandi newtoniano não negava este ou aquele método epistêmico, simplesmente, por divergirem em seus procedimentos, mas, encarava-os como métodos que podiam andar juntos, na construção do conhecimento científico. Analisemos como ele descreve seu método, seu modus operandi, para que seja necessária uma apreciação da influência da metafísica no método científico. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to present the analogy between the thoughts of Epicurus de Samos and Friedrich Nietzsche regarding the notion of “freedom”. In Epicurus, the idea of “freedom” (eleuthería) is linked to the idea of “self-assertion” (autárkeia), since “freedom” for Epicurus means the “exercise of wisdom” through the autonomy of the “sage” (sophós, prhóneo) when it is free to act according to thought. In a similar way, in Nietzsche the idea of freedom (Freiheit) is linked to the (...) idea of “affirming life” (Lebensbejahung) – and “of oneself” – in acting, when the “superman” (Übermensch) is above of good and evil and being able to create and determine their own values. The discussion about freedom, according to the thought of Epicurus and Nietzsche, makes it possible to identify the analogy between them regarding the understanding of the importance of freedom in philosophical action, in addition to promoting a reflection on thinking and acting in the world. (shrink)

The article considers the possibility of saying the same truth in different expressions. It is relevant the Fregean distinction between sense and reference. The author shows the deep difference between the objective Fregean notion of truth and Aquinas' version, according to which the truth of the proposition is related, in many cases, to the situation of the speaker.

This article aims to develop a new account of scientific explanation for computer simulations. To this end, two questions are answered: what is the explanatory relation for computer simulations? And what kind of epistemic gain should be expected? For several reasons tailored to the benefits and needs of computer simulations, these questions are better answered within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Unlike previous efforts in the literature, I submit that the explanatory relation is between the simulation model and the (...) results of the simulation. I also argue that our epistemic gain goes beyond the unificationist account, encompassing a practical dimension as well. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

The objective of this article is to approach the way in which Kant considers the “analogies of experience” necessary connections for the scientific representation of the physical world to occur. The method consists of carrying out a conceptual analysis of selected excerpts from theCritique of pure reasonthat may serve to support the interpretation that the analogies of experience are, for Kant, rules that determine the necessary links between perceptions and the ability to understand phenomena. from them. In this way, we (...) seek to explain the divergence between pure knowledge and empirical knowledge, as well as the way in which physics manages to maintain its a priori concepts. -/- O objetivo deste artigo é abordar a maneira como Kant considera as “analogias da experiência” ligações necessárias para ocorrer a representação científica do mundo físico. O método consiste em analisar trechos selecionados da Crítica da razão pura, sobretudo do texto “Analítica dos princípios”, que apresentem as analogias da experiência como regras que determinam as ligações necessárias entre as percepções e a capacidade de compreensão dos fenômenos. Kant argumenta que embora os objetos sejam em si mesmos inacessíveis a nós isto não implica a impossibilidade de pensarmos neles. O resultado é uma perspectiva sobre o conhecimento científico capaz de considerar as analogias da experiência para manter alguns conceitos a priori sobre o mundo físico. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present the assumptions of Nietzsche's critique of the notion of “truth” that allow to consider his “perspectivism” an excellent critical and epistemological alternative to philosophy of science. It takes place, therefore, an interpretation of the Nietzschean expressions “tragedy”, “tragic knowledge”, “life”, “perspectivism” and “truth”. Nietzsche seems to be convinced that the belief in the notion of “truth” cannot be consistent with “life”, since “life” is also “tragedy” and therefore cannot be reduced to a (...) concept. On the other hand, the notion of “truth” found in natural science seeks to consolidate a concept about reality, which nullifies the plurality of perspectives on life. Thus, an analogy between this aspect behind Nietzsche's perspectivism and the construction of scientific knowledge allows us to consider that the construction of scientific knowledge needs to disregard the notion of truth and to consider all the individual perspectives of scientists – science must not seek truths but metaphors or perspectives on “life” – which allows to show an excellent contribution of Nietzsche to the debates about the notion of truth in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é apontar cinco aspectos do pensamento nietzschiano que podem ser relevantes para os debates da filosofia da ciência em torno da natureza e representação do conhecimento científico. Para tanto, é realizada uma revisão de literatura com o objetivo de selecionar trechos de obras nietzschianas como O nascimento da tragédia, Genealogia da moral, A gaia ciência e outras que permitam interpretar Nietzsche como um filósofo da ciência preocupado com a construção do conhecimento cientifico sobre a realidade física. (...) Como resultado é possível identificar uma proposta epistemológica na perspectiva nietzschiana, cuja representação objetiva do mundo deve apontar para uma estética da vida. -/- The purpose of this article is to point out five aspects of Nietzschean thought that may be relevant to debates in the philosophy of science around the nature and representation of scientific knowledge. To this end, a literature review is carried out with the aim of selecting excerpts from Nietzschean works such as The Birth of Tragedy, Genealogy of Morals, The Gay Science and others that allow us to interpret Nietzsche as a philosopher of science concerned with the construction of scientific knowledge about the physical reality. As a result, it is possible to identify an epistemological proposal in the Nietzschean perspective, whose objective representation of the world should point to an aesthetics of life. (shrink)

Este artículo brinda algunas respuestas y alternativas a ciertos problemas y propuestas en el área de la teoría democrática. El ensayo tiene como enfoque la cuestión de distinguir sistemas que pueden parecer democráticos sin serlo de sistemas realmente democráticos. Develando algunos actores disfrazados del discurso democrático en América Latina, el artículo argumenta que es preferible la regla de la mayoría como base para la identificación del bien común por medio del interés general, que reglas de minorías, consentimiento total o bases (...) constitucionales opuestas al gobierno de la mayoría. Esto se hace sin desestimar a las minorías ni las constituciones, ni lo ideal de la unanimidad. Simplemente las ubica. La investigación incluye una nueva respuesta al problema de la supuesta irracionalidad de la democracia identificada originalmente por Platón y después formalizada por Arrow. (shrink)

By “epistemic pragmatism” in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known or being justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much evidence we need in favor (...) of a proposition in order to know that the proposition is true depends on our preferences. According to what I shall call extreme epistemic pragmatism, on the other hand, our preferences influence our epistemic position at a more basic level, because they help determine how much justification we actually have in favor of the proposition in question. Simplifying brutally, moderate epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition’s being false, the more justification we need in order to know it, whereas extreme epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition’s being false, the less justification we have for it. Recently, Fantl and McGrath have presented an interesting argument for moderate epistemic pragmatism, an argument which relies on the principle that (roughly) knowledge is sufficient for action (KA). In this paper I argue that KA, together with a plausible principle about second-order evidence, entails extreme epistemic pragmatism. (shrink)

Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. More recently, other authors have argued that the resulting theory is well- placed to deal with fine-grained doxastic attitudes (credences). In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of (...) credences and the notion of probability involved in their treatment. I argue that the notion of probability in question can only be an epistemic (or evidential) kind of probability. I conclude that the resulting theory will be incompatible with Reliabilism in one important respect: it cannot deliver on the reductivist promise of Reliabilism. I also argue that attention to the justification of basic beliefs reveals limitations in the Evidentialist framework as well. The theory that results from the right combination of Evidentialism and Reliabilism, therefore, is neither Evidentialist nor Reliabilist. (shrink)

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear or where there (...) is no perceived object at all. The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states. (shrink)

I discuss Turri's puzzle about withholding. I argue that attention to the way in which evidence can justify withholding dissolves the puzzle.

El Realismo Científico Estándar sostiene el enfoque metafísico de que el mundo es como es independiente de la mente. Sin embargo, el presente artículo demuestra cómo esta postura es incompatible con todas las teorías no-eliminativistas sobre la mente, lo cual hace que la postura sea inconsistente, incompatible con la ciencia, elimina la consciencia, la intencionalidad, la causación mental y la ética. Se propone una tesis realista alternativa que conserva la idea de que el mundo en general es de la forma (...) que es, independiente de lo que pensemos sobre él, compatible con la mente como parte real del mundo. Este cambio restaura la posibilidad de consistencia, la mente, la consciencia, la intencionalidad, la ciencia y la ética. -/- Standard Scientific Realism holds the metaphysical view that the world is the way it is independent of the mind. However, this paper demonstrates how this view is incompatible with all non-eliminativist theories of mind, leading it to be inconsistent, incompatible with science, and eliminating consciousness, intentionality, mental causation and ethics. An alternative realist thesis is proposed which preserves the idea that generally the world is the way it is independent of what we think of it, compatible with mind as a real part of the world. This reform restores the possibility of consistency, mind, consciousness, intentionality, science and ethics, while at the same time preserving the theoretical advantages over non-realist competitors. (shrink)

Self-control, the capacity to resist temptations and pursue longer-term goals over immediate gratifications, is crucial in determining the overall shape of our lives, and thereby in our ability to shape our identities. As it turns out, this capacity is intimately linked with our ability to control the direction of our attention. This raises the worry that perhaps social media are making us more easily distracted people, and therefore less able to exercise self-control. Is this so? And is it necessarily a (...) bad thing? This paper analyzes the nature of attention, its vices and virtues, and what currently available evidence has to say about the effects of social media on attention and self-control. The pattern that seems to be emerging is that, although there is an association between higher use of social media and lower attentional control, we do not yet know whether it is social media use that makes people more distracted, or whether those who use social media the most do so because they are more easily distracted. Either way, the rise of the ‘Web 2.0’ does raise questions about whether the virtues of attention will change in the future, and whether this will bring with it a transformation in the way we shape our selves. (shrink)

Self-control is the ability to inhibit temptations and persist in one’s decisions about what to do. In this article, we review recent evidence that suggests implicit beliefs about the process of self-control influence how the process operates. While earlier work focused on the moderating influence of willpower beliefs on depletion effects, we survey new directions in the field that emphasize how beliefs about the nature of self-control, self-control strategies, and their effectiveness have effects on downstream regulation and judgment. These new (...) directions highlight the need to better understand the role of self-control beliefs in naturalistic decision-making. (shrink)

In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...) the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories. (shrink)